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Abstract 
The thesis examines the truth and reconciliation commission in South Africa and 
its possibilities to act as a vehicle in the process of consolidating democracy. The 
norms and values that can be found in the principles and practices of the 
commission are scrutinized, and the means of presenting this norms to the public 
is also looked into. The issue of how to deal with the human rights violations of a 
past regime forms the theoretical framework, and the truth commission is 
compared with the traditional solution of court proceedings. In particular, the 
question of whether to grant amnesty or not is in focus. Further, the possibilities to 
strengthen the rule of law, promoting a human rights culture, promoting 
accountability, and deterring future return to non-democratic governance are 
examined. In the study both shortcomings and advantages of a truth commission 
are displayed.  
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1 Introduction 
This chapter will give an introduction to the subject and the aim of the study. The 
truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) is here explained in a wider context, 
that is, as part of the dilemma concerning what will happen with those who have 
committed serious violations against human rights. The problem examined in the 
study- to what extent has and will the TRC improve the process of consolidating 
democracy- is also justified as a relevant topic.  
 
The methodology and the material I am using will be addressed in this chapter. Further, the 
delimitations I have made to be able to present a structured thesis and the definitions of 
certain concepts that play an important role in the study will be discussed. Especially the 
concepts of “democratic consolidation”, “rule of law”, and “accountability” are presented. 
 
1.1 Subject and Purpose 
During 45 years of apartheid and 30 years of armed resistance by the African 
National Congress (ANC) and others, tens of thousands of South Africans 
suffered serious human rights violations and war crimes. In 1995, the Promotion 
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act establishing the TRC was passed by the 
South African Parliament. The model of a truth commission is a relatively new 
innovation and, besides in South Africa, it has especially been practised in the 
Latin Americas. The Truth Commission is a phenomenon that has increasingly 
gained ground and its pros and cons are in need of further evaluation. Admit 
tingly, there are circumstances which separate each case and each country, but the 
core issue remains the same; how should the new democratic regime reckon with 
the human rights violations committed by, and during the former regime? A vast 
academic literature is available on this dilemma; not only political scientist but 
international lawyers and philosophers have discussed the above-mentioned 
question thoroughly. The Truth Commissions were introduced in the early 1990´s 
as the answer to this question. In Hayners’ definition of Truth Commissions they 
have certain core characteristics:  
 
• They focus on the past and try to paint the overall picture of certain 
human rights or humanitarian law abuses over a period of time, not 
focusing on a specific event. 
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• They exist over a temporary and pre-defined period of time, ceasing 
to exist with the submission of a report. 
• They are vested with some authority that allows it greater access to 
information, greater security or protection to address sensitive issues, 
and a greater impact with its report than other investigations have. 
(Hayner 1994) 
 
Truth commissions are non-judicial bodies and have fewer powers than do courts, perpetrators 
will not be put in prison by the commission for instance. (Freeman,Hayner:123) 
 
Truth Commissions evoke a number of questions such as; how do we prevent the former 
regime to block the transition to democracy? How can victims of the former regimes’ human 
rights violations get a feeling of justice? Should we forgive, forget, punish or prosecute? Is it 
necessary to know the truth in order to advance reconciliation? In order to be able to present a 
focused and coherent argumentation it is necessary to further distinguish the question that I 
will devote my thesis to. The issue that will be in focus in my thesis is;  
 
• What are the advantages and shortcomings of the TRC relating to the 
process of consolidating democracy? 
 
I intend to look beyond the issue of transitional justice, appertaining to the democratic 
transition, and focus more on the phase of consolidation of democracy. In making this 
priority, I hope to bring some new conclusions to the already vast literature on truth 
commissions.  It would not be possible to make a complete evaluation of the impact that TRC 
has had on the democratic process in South Africa, given that reconciliation and promotion of 
democratic values are both long-term processes. Rather, the object is to examine the 
possibilities for the TRC to promote the consolidation of a democratic State. In this study I 
hope to be able to also draw conclusions of a general nature, which are not only applicable to 
the South African case 
1.2 Method and Material 
The methodological point of departure derives from the school of normative 
institutionalism. TRC is then looked upon as an institution, or as a part of an 
institution, that could influence actors. Normative institutionalism argues that an 
institution can have an impact on the values, norms, interest, identities and 
believes of actors. The values that are promoted by the TRC are considered to 
influence the basic values among the population, and political democracy also 
depends on the design of political institutions. (March, Olsen:17, Lowndes:95, 99)  
 
In chapter 2 the theoretical framework will be presented, but more recent theories on truth 
commissions in particular will be presented and integrated in the subsequent chapters. Thus, 
the thesis will also be theory consuming. Chapter 3 is devoted to the norms and values to be 
found in the TRC, while chapter 4 looks at the means of reaching out to the public. In the final 
chapter I will summarize the conclusions reached in the study. 
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I was granted a Minor Field Study scholarship and spent two months in South Africa, were I 
was accommodated by the Centre for Human Rights in Pretoria. The purpose of the field 
study was to optimise the possibility to gather relevant material and information on the topic. 
The material mainly consists of secondary material; that is academic literature and reports, but 
I have also used primary resources such as legislative Acts. During my stay in the country I 
also engaged in numerous discussions with locals, which enhanced the understanding and 
brought new perspectives to the issue examined.  
 
1.3 Definitions and Delimitations 
In my project I will use a rather maximalist view of the concepts of democracy 
and democratic consolidation. According to Diamond and Grugel, liberal 
democracy requires that the executive power is constrained by the independent 
power of other government institutions. An independent judiciary and parliament 
are functioning as actors of horizontal accountability and a complex bureaucracy 
that can make claim of impartiality needs to be established. It is also crucial that 
the elected and representative government should be controlled by constitutional 
channels of accountability, and citizens should be politically equal under the law. 
In a democracy an independent, non-discriminatory judiciary effectively protects 
individual and other centres of power enforce group liberties and its decisions. 
(Diamond. 1999.: 65, 111-112, Grugel.. 2002. :69-70.) 
  
According to the rule of law legal rules are applied fairly, consistently and predictability on 
equivalent cases. All citizens should have political and legal equality, and the state agents are 
themselves subject to the law. In a democracy the rule of law protects citizens from 
unjustified detention, exile, torture and undue interference in their personal lives, by states 
and other organized forces. (Diamond. 1999.:11, 65, 111-112) Thus, the rule of law means 
that minimal rights and duties of citizens are vested in the legislation and that the limits of 
state activity are legally defined (Grugel:69). Accountability and rule of law are therefore 
essential concepts for this study.  
 
Consolidation is here used to describe the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation to 
the concept of democracy.  Democratic consolidation encompasses a shift in political culture,  
the society agrees that democracy should be the system that governs the country, even in 
times of political and economical poor governmental performances; it becomes the only game 
in town. (Diamond. 1999.: 65, 111-112,  Grugel. 2002.: 69-70.) 
 
Diamond lists three tasks that all new democracies must handle if they are to become 
consolidated:  
 
1. Democratic deepening. This requires greater executive and military accountability to the 
law, to other branches of the government, and autonomy for independent action by civil 
society, and more effective protection for the political and civil rights of all citizens..  
  9
2. Political institutionalisation, strengthening the formal representative and governmental 
structures of democracy, the judicial system must have a high degree of institutional 
coherence, capacity and autonomy if individual and group rights are to be protected. 
Strengthening the bureaucracy, such as promoting a professional and effective police, 
political parties, legislatures are also important aspects of consolidating democracy. 
3. Regime performance. Over time and over a succession of specific governments, the 
democratic regime must produce sufficiently positive outcomes to build broad political 
legitimacy. The citizens expect, at least, accountability, political freedom and 
constitutionalism. (Diamond: 74-76) 
 
Democracy can be consolidated only when no significant collective actors challenge the 
legitimacy of democratic institutions or violate its constitutional norms, laws and procedures. 
(Diamond: 66-67) At the level of mass public, consolidation is indicated when the 
overwhelming majority of the public believe that democracy is the best form of government 
in principle and the most suitable form of government for their country at their time. 
Diamond: 68)  
 
As shown above the topic is in certain respects interdisciplinary; it concerns both political 
science and law, although emphasis is laid on the former in this thesis. In this study, human 
rights are addressed as far as they are part of the concept of consolidating democracy. Some 
interesting aspects, like the emerging right to know the truth, may therefore partly fall outside 
the scope of this project. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
This chapter will provide the reader with an introduction to the previous research 
on the question concerning how the new democratic regime should deal with the 
human rights abuses during the former regime. I will primarily discuss the 
theories of Huntington, who addressed the issue that he referred to as  “the 
torturers’ problem”, and O’Donnel and Schmitter. These theories do not 
specifically discuss truth commissions, rather they concern the transition to 
democracy and the issue of prosecution at a more general level. Although the 
theoretical framework presented here primarily focuses on the transition to 
democracy, they compose a necessary background to understand the phase of 
consolidating democracy as well. The problems of transitions to a vast extent also 
apply in the consolidating phase.   
 
 
Huntington concludes that in practice the choice of the new regime depends almost 
exclusively on politics, if it even can be described as a choice. About half of the pre- 1990 
democratizations were transformations initiated by the leaders of the existing authoritarian 
regimes and almost all these regimes decreed an amnesty as a part of that process. In many 
cases the authoritarian regime not only acted in their own interest in legislating amnesty, they 
had also the power to make the amnesty stick. (Huntington:215-216) 
 
According to Zalaquett a policy to deal with past human rights abuses should have two overall 
objectives: to prevent the recurrence of such abuses and to repair the damage they caused. In 
order to succeed in this the country must achieve a measure of national unity and 
reconciliation, and build and reconstruct institutions that are conducive to a stable and fair 
political system.(Zalaquett:5-6) 
 
The policy must also meet certain conditions of legitimacy: The truth must be known, 
otherwise could a harsh policy against the former regime be tantamount to arbitrariness or 
revenge, while a policy of clemency would be equivalent to granting impunity. Further, the 
truth must be complete; including the nature and extension of violations, who were 
perpetrators, and the fate of victims. The truth must also be officially proclaimed and publicly 
exposed, so that it allows the findings to form part of the historical record of the nation and 
establishes an authoritative version of the events.( Zalaquett:6-7) The policy must represent 
the will of the people and it must not violate international human rights law.( Zalaquett:9) 
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2.1 Arguments in favour of prosecution 
Prosecuting human rights violations can substantially enhance the chance for 
establishing the rule of law and signalling that no individuals are outside the reach 
of legal accountability. (Minow:57-58) Democracy is based on law and the point 
must be made that neither high officials nor the military are above that law. 
(Huntington:213) O´Donnell and Schmitter believe that the worst of bad solutions 
would be to try and ignore the issue of what to do with the former perpetrators.. 
Such a position would be to reinforce the sense of impunity and immunity of the 
armed forces.(O´ Donnel, Schmitter:30) Punishment is a way of  restoring the rule 
of law by protecting the individual against other powers in society. It is also a way 
to provide victims a form of legal redress. Prosecutions could also help to deter 
future crimes, either on an individual or a general level. (Teitel:149)  In some 
countries one can show that a policy of impunity results in encouragement of 
further human rights violations, (Méndez:276-277)1 
 
Making state criminals accountable says something about the democracy that the country is 
trying to establish, and preserving memory and setting human rights accounts can be part of 
the formula for a lasting peace. (Méndez: 257-258) It is difficult to imagine how a society can 
return to some degree of functioning which would provide support for political democracy 
without coming to terms with the most painful elements of its own past. By refusing to 
confront itself of its worst fears and resentments, such a society would be burying not just its 
past but the very ethical values it needs to make its future liveable. (O´ Donnel, Schmitter:30-
32) 
 
Méndez further argues that the purpose of punishment reaches beyond merely restoring the 
rule of law by protecting the individual against other powers in society. It also heightens the 
value of certain norms like prohibiting torture and disappearances. (Méndez:277) To assert 
the supremacy of democratic values and encourage the public to believe in them is one task of 
the new regime that could be enforced through prosecutions. (Huntington:213) An obstacle to 
democracy is the authoritarian legacy that still plays a role in the democratizing society. The 
past continues to shape the culture, composition and legality of the state (Grugel: 85) In many 
countries this has led to the urgent challenge of reducing the autonomous and unaccountable 
power of the military. The military must be removed from the political sphere, limiting in its 
involvement in domestic affairs. (O´Donnel, Schmitter:30-32) One important task would 
therefore be to stigmatise and separate the military from the public realm. (Teitel:149) 
Another important issue is to deter future human rights violations by security officers, and to 
clear out the perpetrators of the old regime from high positions would be one way of doing 
this. To prosecute and punish would of course be an effective way of removing certain actors. 
Another alternative is to use civil law measures, like dismissal. But to purge the institutions 
without determining the individual guilt in a fair process seems to be contrary to the rule of 
law. In order to make the public trust in the institutions it would be of great importance to put 
an end to the influence of the actors of the old regime, prosecution would be a mean to restore 
faith in the institutions.  
 
                                                 
1 This has been the case in Peru and Colombia according to Zalaquett. 
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In order to be able to hold state bureaucrats, soldiers, police and executives accountable there 
must be a judicial system that has political and constitutional autonomy to ensure the rule of 
law. This of course requires independent and professional judges. It also demands that the 
courts have the staffing and other resources to be effective. Further, there needs to be an 
effective legal system including prosecutors, police, public defenders etcetera. It also requires 
a clearly codified body of law. Only when organized actors in politics and civil society 
recognize their long-term interest in a strong, independent judiciary can that branch of the 
government gain the authority and resources to impose accountability on other state actors. 
(Diamond: 111-112). However, practical reasons often interfere with or prevent prosecution; 
insufficient material and resources, untrained staff, lack of enough power or courage are some 
obstacles. (Minow:57-58) Reforming the police and the judicial system is therefore crucial 
when it comes to strengthen a culture of democratic rights. (Grugel:77) According to this 
argument prosecutions could help to restore faith in the judiciary.  
 
Establishing and habitualizing the commitment to the rules of the democratic game is the core 
feature of the process of consolidation. To become consolidated, greater executive and 
military accountability to the law and to the public is necessary. More effective protection of 
civil and political rights of the citizens also needs to be established. Political 
institutionalisation is the way to create workable rules of the game, and in this system the  
judiciary must have a high degree of institutional coherence, capacity and autonomy. 
(Diamond:73-75) . Accountability for criminal acts is something a democracy should provide. 
Failure to do so is a proof of poor political performance of the new regime, (Diamond:90-91) 
and this poor performance is a clear threat to the emerging democracy. (Grugel:82)  
 
Prosecution is also said to be the most effective means of separating collective guilt from 
individual guilt. (Méndez:277) It expresses who is a criminal and who is not. (Teitel:149) By 
prosecuting the offender, the people that belonged to a particular group that was allegedly 
responsible for atrocities can clear their names if trials take place. (Huyse:105) 
 
Finally, the process of prosecution has been said to allow judicial resolution of past wounds, 
and thereby enable reconciliation of the various interest groups. (Teitel:149) 
2.2 Arguments in favour of amnesty 
History reveals that the more brutal, inhumane, and extensive were the repressive 
actions, the more their actual perpetrators feel threatened and will tend to form a 
block opposing any transition. A policy of impunity would seem most viable and 
least dangerous for democratization where the repression was initially less brutal 
and extensive, or where they did not occur a long time ago. Ironically, it seems, 
where and when it is easier to bury the past, is where and when it is less important 
to do so. On the contrary, where these past accounts are of greater weight and 
more recent origins and involve a wider spectrum of persons, it is much more 
difficult and dangerous to attempt to collect them. (O´ Donnell, Scmitter:30-32) 
Diamond also agree with the view that prosecution for past crimes usually is more 
than the relation between the civil regime and the military can bear. There is a 
good chance of a military reaction, ultimately in the form of a coup if the 
  13
government choose to prosecute. (Diamond:112-113)  Punishment of individuals 
is seen as impeding the consolidation of democracy, and to consolidate the 
democracy in a country where human rights are guaranteed should take 
precedence over the alternative to seek retroactive justice that could compromise 
that process. 
 
 
Whitehead suggests that accountability could be viewed as a mean to fulfil normative 
objectives in a democracy, such as liberty, security or equality. If seen as only a mean to 
achieve certain goals, it could also be possible to have to much accountability. Certain forms 
of impunity could then be argued for if that is considered as a better way to achieve the 
objective goal than accountability would have been. Accountability through legal process is 
but one form of accountability, supervision of an independent mass media, internal 
administrative investigations, electoral sanctions are other means. (Whitehead:94-96) Too 
much enthusiasm for accountability might even lead to demands for strong leadership and 
unchecked authority. (Whitehead:98) However, as elaborated on in a section 1.3, in this thesis 
I am using the theory that accountability is not just a mean to achieve certain objects but a 
necessary precondition for a democracy. 
 
The judicial integrity is often in the hands of political compromise. Prosecution could form 
the cornerstone of a political program. If the new regime presents them as committed to this 
aim and tries to build their legitimacy on this, it might be troublesome if the political realities 
are putting up obstacles. The authoritarian legacy might cause compromises that does not go 
well together with the announced ethic. This will probably lead to the public regarding the 
new regime as hypocrites. To base the regimes´ legitimacy upon the promise of true judicial 
independence can be devastating. In worst case such a policy of implies that the courts´ and 
the laws´ autonomy are dependent on the rulers wishes. (Osiel:139-144)2 Thus, the 
democratic values will not be strengthened by the trials, instead there is a risk of non-
democratic groups making political use of the failures of the government.    
 
The prosecutor may chose to only prosecute the highest ranking officers. This approach risks 
drawing a line between blameworthy and blameless parties. Such an approach might fail to 
win the publics acceptance as it could seem morally arbitrary only holding some of the 
offenders accountable. The line between culpable and inculpable parties is not clear. In many 
cases both opposition groups and governments grossly violated human rights. Many groups 
and people might have shared in the guilt for the crimes committed by the authoritarian 
regime. In such a case a general amnesty for all provides a far stronger base for democracy 
than efforts to prosecute according to Huntington (Huntington:213). By pinning blame on a 
limited sector of the society, human rights trials re-invent history. Blaming the military but 
not the civilian perpetrators can deepen the political conflict. The trials thereby risks to 
weaken the credibility of the new democratic judiciary. Sometimes this is referred to as the 
question of collective guilt, the atrocities involves so many people in so many ways that it is 
misguided to focus only on those within the narrow scope of criminal liability. Moral and 
political argument often ascribes responsibility for actions not falling within the scope of 
criminal liability. A judicial assessment may only address the contribution of the atrocities of 
the former regime. If the acts of the opposition, for instance a guerrilla, is not addressed there 
is a clear unbalance. There needs to be an adequate account for the connection between those 
                                                 
2 This was the case in Argentina, and the government was thereby sending out a signal that the rule of law would 
advance when politics permitted and retreat when politics required. 
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aspects of the past violations judged in a Court and on the other hand those excluded from 
criminal investigation. There also needs to be a distinction between the two sorts of 
contribution to the atrocities that justifies such differential treatment by law, the nature of the 
offences must be clearly defined.  
 
A refusal or inability of telling the whole truth can evoke a publics´ view of the trials as 
hypocrisy. In the period of democratic transition, expeditious and confidential procedure is 
often impossible. Courts are not committed to produce a coherent narrative about the nation 
dilemma, they are not likely to call for account of the entire regime. The problem is very 
much linked to the fact information is not accessible. State archives containing evidence of 
the practices of the state actors could be confidential or hidden. The offenders themselves are 
probably unwilling to reveal the crimes committed. Witnesses will not testify in public for 
fear of being killed and the courts are incapable of rendering justice. There is an obvious risk 
that a Court respecting the standards of fair trial will not be able to punish many of the 
perpetrators. Lack of proof can lead to the acquittal of well known perpetrators, which will 
certainly damage the publics trust in the legal system. Then, court proceedings do not seem to 
be the answer to disclose the full truth and to lift the mantle of absolute impunity?(Cassel: 
330, Osiel: 125-128, Minow: 57-58).  
 
Insisting on punishment without due process and other principles of fair trial would be 
irresponsible, because the quest for justice would be contrary to the principle that it is based 
on. A decision to prosecute might be incompatible with fundamental standards of criminal 
law. To insist on prosecutions in the presence of an important legal obstacle like a pre-
existing amnesty law would be irresponsible, because it would violate the very rule of law, 
including the principle of “nulla poene sine lege”. The latter meaning that is a person should 
not be convicted for an act that was not illegal when it was committed. (Méndez: 271-273) 
(Kritz: xxvii). The new regime should therefore not ignore an amnesty law that has been 
legally established by the former regime. There is also a risk that the act did not constitute a 
crime when it was committed. In this case it would be difficult for a regular court to order any 
sanction. 
 
Concerning administrative penalties, the rule of law rejects collective punishment and 
discrimination on the basis of political opinion or affiliation. (Kritz: xxv) Citizens´ right to 
vote, to run for office, or to exercise freedom of association are fundamental elements of a 
democracy, and exercising these freedoms should not result in any sanction.  (Kritz:xxvi) 
 
That the courts must themselves be trustworthy and efficient is of course a crucial element. 
(Whitehead: 94-96) In times of transition this requirement is a very troublesome one. The 
institutions of the old regime generally did not have much credibility among the citizens, 
since structures and compositions of the courts are not easy to change over night. Staff 
working for the old regime might still occupy important positions. Even if a completely new 
staff is recruited for the task of prosecuting and judging the offenders the problem still 
remains. There is a great risk that the public still connect the judiciary with its malfunctioning 
predecessor. The decisions of the court will then be looked upon as just another arbitrary 
judgment. Judicial impartiality may also fall victim to political pressure, time constraint, 
insufficient number of trained judges and lawyers. The risk of trials becoming a victors´ 
justice is evident. 
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3 Promoting the consolidation of 
democracy  
The TRC has been called a uniquely democratic commission, (Liebenberg: 147) 
and this view is something I will examine in this main chapter of the thesis. A 
number of aspects is shed light on, both concerning the establishment and work of 
the TRC. In particular, the questions of accountability and rule of law, including 
the promotion of a human rights culture, are addressed.    
3.1 A Democratic establishment? 
The truth commissions are also dependent on the political reality that forms the 
political outcome of the transition. Popkin argues that truth commissions do not 
bring about transition to democracy but instead are most useful after such 
transitions are well underway. There needs to be a considerable consensus in order 
to break with the past (Pokin:289) Albon also subscribes to the view that there 
must be consensus in society that the commission is needed and that its 
membership is appropriate.(Albon:290-291) On the other hand Hayner argues that 
it should be implemented as soon after the resolution of  a conflict or government 
transition as possible. (Hayner:652) If initiated by a new president overseeing a 
fundamentally unchanged military, the initial weeks or months of his or her 
administration, when presidential power is strong, may be the only chance to 
establish a truth commission. (Hayner:640) 
  
There is also a clear risk that the commission will be established with improper political 
motives. The government may use the truth commission as a vehicle for pursuit of political 
vendettas. it may also be made deliberately weak, just so that the results could be easier to 
challenge. By installing a commission, the government escape criticism of not redressing the 
past human rights abuses, although the result of the commission may be very poor. (Freeman: 
127) 3 
 
Neier challenges the view that democratic decision-making and consensus is always 
conducive to democracy in this process. Victims of abuse often belong to a minority, and if 
the majority should determine the rights of this group the outcome may be counter productive 
to democratic consolidation. (Neier 1997:102)  However, in South Africa it was actually the 
majority who were the victims, and this objection is therefore not as relevant is this case  
                                                 
3 Establishment and operation of the truth commission can be undermined where there is widespread social 
identification with the perpetrators rather than the victims. (Freeman, Hayner:128) 
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On 2 February 1990 President de Klerk announced that certain prisoners should be released, 
and that political parties, including ANC should be allowed. The indemnity Act from 15 May 
1990 gave the President the right to grant temporary immunity. Qualified amnesty was 
granted to protect ANC personnel who were to return to South Africa. (Liebenberg: 129) The 
further Indemnity Act granted an additional 200 persons amnesty, many of them had been 
denied amnesty under the first act. (Jeffery:79) In South Africa, those who were in power 
remained in control and the security forces were still controlled by the old government. 
(Sarkin 1998: 657)  
 
Several options concerning the issue of whether or not granting amnesty were discussed. A 
blanket or general amnesty was proposed, this solution was advocated for by F.W. de Klerk 
and the security forces, but was considered as untenable by the ANC. The alternative to claim 
accountability in the form of prosecutions and sanctions was supported by the liberation 
movements in exile. However, Thabo Mbeki has witnessed that high level generals had 
warned him about the consequences if members of the security forces should be prosecuted 
after the election. The third option, the TRC, therefore became the only reasonable alternative. 
(Boraine 2000:143) 
 
The TRC was established by a Parliament Act, thus, the South Africans opted for a truth 
commission via their parliament. The Act was established after the first democratic election in 
South Africa and a broad support among the representatives of the people could thereby be 
ascertained.  
 
Contrary to many other commissions the TRC was a domestic project, although it received 
donations from a number of countries4. Advantages to UN sponsorship generally include the 
legitimacy derived from the international community's strong support of the commission's 
work, which pressures the parties to collaborate with the truth commission. The greater 
international attention will also increase pressure for fulfilment of the recommendations or the 
implementation of reforms. (Hayner:642-643)  
 
3.1.1 Composition 
Unless the people feel that they have part of the process of decision-making, they 
will doubt the integrity and motivations of the commission, and those involved in 
the process. Legitimacy means that the process is accepted as an objective body 
capable of finding an unbiased truth. This perception is generally achieved by 
having a well-balanced commission of highly respected people. (Sarkin: 230-231) 
Hayner and Freeman also agrees that a truth commission enjoys greater legitimacy 
where the process of defining their powers and mandate include active 
involvement from many different sectors of society. (Freeman, Hayner:130)   
 
To be successful, investigatory commissions must establish their independence from all the 
actors in a contested history and their moral authority to be able to examine and judge the acts 
                                                 
4 (EU, Sweden, US, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium) Vol 1) 
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and motivations of others.5 An international commission has several advantages: distance 
from domestic political bickering, a claim to greater objectivity, and a higher degree of 
protection from reprisals, the possibility to publicise its recommendations internationally and 
use international pressure to see them implemented  (Popkin:269) This distance may however 
give rise to the perception and, perhaps, the reality that the report is merely a UN document 
which gives an outside version of a historical period. (Popkin: 270) The main disadvantages 
of an international sponsorship are that staff might not have any experience of the country and 
the fact that the international staff leaves the country, which may hamper the strengthening of 
the structures within the country. (Hayner: 642-643) 
 
The candidates for commissioners could not be high-profile members of any political party. 
(Sarkin: 658) Further, it is important to have a variety of ethnical and political backgrounds 
represented. Sarkin1999: 231) If the commission is balanced and represents all political 
sectors, it stands a better chance of being accepted as an impartial, independent moral 
authority. (Albon:290-291)  
 
The persons selected to manage the truth commission will be a crucial factor for the success 
of failure of the commission. The members of most truth commissions have been appointed 
through procedures with no or little consultations of civil society. On the other hand, in South 
Africa a consultative approach to commissioner selection was practised. Mandela appointed a 
small representative selection committee, consisting of individuals from the largest political 
parties and civil society, including representatives of human rights organisations. The 
committee called for nominations and received 300 names that it trimmed down to 50 people 
to be interviewed. The interviews took place in public session and were closely followed by 
the press. The selection committee narrowed it down to a list of 25 candidates, which it sent to 
Nelson Mandela for final selection. (Boraine:144-145,Freeman, Hayner:129-130) The 
president announced the appointment of the 17 commissioners on 15 December 1995. In all 
the TRC hired more staff than previous commissions, over 200 multidisciplinary staff, 
including both nationals and non-nationals. 
 
Two of the appointed commissioners 6 were not on the selection panel's recommended list. 
(Sarkin 1996:621) Mandela apparently chose to include them in order getting a better balance 
of the commission. The Commission included 8 lawyers and 4 Christian Ministers of 
Religion. 7 of the members were black (black constituted 70% of population. And 6 of them 
were white (17 % of population.) Two of the commissioners7 politically came from the far 
right, members of the Afrikaner Broederband. (Bell: 242) The selection procedure represents 
a democratic norm and could serve to strengthen a fair election procedure.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 For instance, in El Salvador, only foreign dignitaries were selected as commissioners and there was a 
prohibition on using Central Americans as staff to the commission. The parties to the peace agreement had 
attached great importance to the international character of the commission, and consequently no Salvadorans 
were hired to work for the commission. Buergenthal:296) 
6 Khoza Mgoja and Denzil Potgeister 
7 Wynand Malan and Chris de Jagger 
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3.1.2 Civil society  
The role of the civil society in the process of consolidating democracy is a matter 
of debate. Most authors seems to a agree that a vital civil society could e useful 
tool in this processes. Diamond argues that the most basic function of the civil 
society is to provide the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the 
control of the state by the society, and for democratic political institutions as the 
most effective means of exercising that control. (Diamond:239-247)  By 
enhancing the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and 
hence the legitimacy of the political system, a vigorous civil society gives citizens 
respect for the state and positive engagement with it. (Diamond:249) Grugel 
argues that the most important democratic function of the civil society is its 
engagement with the state as a force of change. In this argument she is combining 
the liberal approach, according to which the civil society contribute to democracy 
by aiding the state, and the radical approach saying that the role of the civil 
society is to transform the state. (Grugel:95) In a new democracy the civil society 
may be looking for revenge or they may be weak, and there is also a risk that they 
will take over the role of the state. (Crocker:114) 
 
The public rarely plays a role in crafting the terms of references of a truth commission but the 
TRC were the first example of a process officially opened to encourage public debates and 
input on the terms of references of a truth commission. Hayner:639) The creation of the TRC 
could be described as a democratic procedure, since as many parts of the society as possible 
were given a possibility to be part of this process. Alex Boraine, who became the vice Chair 
of the TRC, started a NGO named “Justice in Transition”. (Liebenberg: 145) Academics held 
public lectures on the topic, and several conferences were held; two seminars entitled 
“Dealing with the past” and “Truth and Reconciliation” were held in 1994.  Points of view 
from the civil society were presented to the Parliamentary Standard Committee on Justice. 
(Boraine:144-145) 
 
One of the compromises between the ANC and NP, namely that amnesty hearing could be 
held behind closed doors, was effectively contested by human rights NGOs. Instead, the 
principle of open hearing, except where it defeats the ends of justice prevailed.  Several 
volunteers from NGOs, community-based organisations, religious and civic organisations 
were employed to take statements from victims. The TRC organised a "designated statement 
taker program". This program trained staff in community organisations, allowed for focus in 
rural areas. Victims could then tell their stories in their mother tongue, often to people they 
knew. (Vol.1:140) In the institutional and special hearings NGOs directly contributed with 
their expertise. (Vol5: 145-150) This interrelatedness suggests that the TRC could be viewed 
as a hybrid between the State and the civil society. (Crocker:110) 
 
International civil society also played a certain role.8 Academic reports and publications could 
contribute with ideas, lessons can be learned from other truth commissions. Human rights 
NGO’s, among them Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, was also active in the 
                                                 
8 Pressure from national or international non-governmental human rights organisations, or from other 
governments, has often played a role in pushing the president or parliament to set up a commission in democratic 
transitions. Hayner: 641) 
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debate. International encouragement could make the truth commission immune from domestic 
criticism, and the TRC actually referred to the international support when answering to the 
criticism. (Crocker:114) 9  
 
The TRC did at least to a certain extent encourage the participation of the civil society which 
must be seen as conducive to the democratic consolidation. Moreover, the civil society did 
have an impact on the TRC by participating in the process and affecting the practice and 
procedures of the institution.  
 
3.2 Preventing a return to a non democratic order 
Memories of the past human rights violations have the potential of haunting the 
nation and its citizens far beyond the initial phase of transition to a democratic 
regime. (Huntington:215-216) A truth commission may help prevent basic points 
of facts from continuing to be a source of conflict or bitterness among the political 
elite. We remember in order not to repeat past atrocities. (Villa-Vicencio 
1999:200) Sarkin concludes that in the absence of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, anger, resentment, hatred, and revenge tend to be the order of the 
day. (Sarkin 1999:225) Villa-Vicencio holds that in South Africa, primarily those 
who suffered least are most determinate to forget the pain of others. (Villa-
Vicencio 1999: 199)  
  
Méndez concludes that experience shows that the old regime perpetrators are probably just as 
terrified at the prospect of truth being revealed as they are that some of them will have to face 
trials. The problem with the old regime inevitably wanting to have a saying in the decision on 
how to deal with past abuses is not put aside by the labelling of the investigation as a truth 
commission. The risk of renewed violence or coups is not impeded by the choice of creating a 
truth commission instead of prosecuting the offenders. (Freeman, Haynes: 127) This problem 
however mostly appertains to the transitional phase of the democratisation. Commissions can 
help establish the truth about the past. An accurate, detailed, impartial, and official record can 
serve to counter the false or exaggerated accounts of the past that were propagated by the 
previous regime. 10 A truth commissions could signal a break with the dark and violent past 
and the transition to a more open and democratic future. It could also weakening anti-
democratic actors who might otherwise continue to pursue their goals outside the democratic 
process. (Freeman, Hayner:125-126)  
 
Compensation has many purposes, it aids the victims to manage the material aspect of their 
loss, it constitutes an official acknowledgement to their pain, and it may deter the state from 
future abuses. (Kritz: xxvii) The TRC gave compensation to both victims and perpetrators 
who witnessed for their costs. Larger sums were paid to the perpetrators, and this could be 
                                                 
9 In El Salvador, strong international support was critical to providing the Commission the financial resources, 
diplomatic support and ultimately international credibility for its potential controversial findings.  (Cassel: 332) 
10 According to Popkin, the greatest achievement of the commissions in Chile, El Salvador and Honduras has 
been the official presentation of an authoritative history, which counters the former regimes account. (Popkin, 
287) 
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seen as a reminder of old structures. (Levinsson: 226) Besides cash payment, reparation was 
also offered in form of inter alia issuing of death certificates, reburials, and expunging of 
criminal records11 (Vol 5: 118) The individual reparation grant structured as cash payment 
was unwise according to Commissioner Malan. Some of the victims may be in need of 
ongoing treatment, while some may not need treatment at all. (Vol 5:452) Truth commissions' 
role in listening to, and validating, the stories of the victims, is described as a major success 
by Popkin. This suggests that it is the process of compiling the commissions' report, as much 
as the final product, which is important. (Popkin, 287) However the TRC recognises that the 
cross-examination did have a traumatising effect on many victims. (Vol 1:185) 
 
Concerning the issue of amnesty two competing views could be argued for. On the one hand, 
amnesty could be said to undermine deterrence, and promote cynicism and disillusionment 
among victims of human rights abuses. (Freeman, Hayner: 137) The TRC on the other hand 
argued that the disclosure made during the amnesty process could produce insights, on which 
basis reconciliation could be made. According to the latter argument, the amnesty process was 
therefore preventing future human rights violations. (Vol.1;121) There seem to have been no 
case of vengeance by victims against those perpetrators that have appeared before the 
commission. (Boraine 2003:175) 
 
The TRC expressed that selective recollection of past violence would easily provide the 
mobilisation for further conflict in the future. Jeffery concludes that the report only told some 
of the truth, although it was required to tell the full truth. For instance at least 12 000 killings 
were left unexplained.  (Jeffery:6) The TRC carefully selected those victims who should 
testify in public. This assessment was based on the nature of the abuse and which part of the 
society the victim represented. The TRC sought to get representation from different types of 
abuses and from all sides of the conflict. (Vol 5:8) The statements and the policy of the TRC 
displays an awareness of the need to present as a complete picture of the past as possible. 
Probably the most important tool in order to fulfil this object is the access to information, and 
I will therefore turn to examine this question below. The mandate of the commission is of 
course vital in its work, and I will therefore look into the terms of reference to examine 
whether there were any inherent obstacles to the object of displaying the full truth. 
 
3.2.1 The terms of reference 
To create authoritative history a commissions work must be broad enough to 
cover the principal harms and to focus on the appropriate time period. It must be 
detailed enough to convince sceptics that the facts found are true, yet must also 
provide the overall patterns and explanations that shape historical accounts. 
Hayner emphasis that a truth commission should recognise up front that it is 
impossible to carry out a complete investigation: a commission must focus on the 
essential. (Popkin:271, Hayner:653) In the final report, the TRC itself 
acknowledge that the picture it reveals is by no means complete. (Vol.1 p. 29). 
 
Unrealistic expectations is a factor that could produce mistrust against the new institutions. 
Commissions can try to expose the multiple causes and conditions contributing to the massive 
                                                 
11 Earlier sentence for political activity was deleted in the record. 
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violations in a way not possible for courts. However, the problem of truth and interpretation 
does not end with the launching of a report. To believe that the discussion concerning what 
really happen will end by the commissions report would be naive. No matter how thoroughly 
the commission has dealt with the past abuses, there will always be other competitive 
interpretations (Minow: 82)  
 
The terms of reference of a truth commission should be sufficiently broad to allow 
investigation into all forms of rights abuses, preferably leaving to the commission itself the 
responsibility to identify the most appropriate cases or practices to investigate. (Hayner:636) 
This is because prioritisation can create frustration on the part of the victims of those 
violations that are excluded from the commission’s mandate. To avoid the appearance of bias, 
it is generally important for the time span considerations chosen to be consecutive and not 
broken up to focus only on selected periods in a nation’s history. (Freeman, Hayner:131) 
 
In South Africa, the major tasks of the Commission to fulfil the overarching objective of 
promoting national unity and reconciliation were- 
 
1. Analysing and describing the causes, nature and extent of gross violations of human 
rights that occurred between 1 March 1960- 10 May 1994. 
2. Granting amnesty to persons who made full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating 
to a criminal acts associated with a political objective.  
3. Restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims of gross human rights violations 
through testimony and recommendations concerning reparations for victims. 
4. Making recommendations on measures to prevent future violations of human rights. 
(Vol 1:)   
 
The question of the period that should be scrutinised was a matter of debate. Some proposed 
1652 -when the white settlers first arrived-, others suggested 1910- when the first Constitution 
of South Africa was established. 1948- when the National Party came to power- was also 
proposed. The parliament finally proposed that the TRC should focus on the period from 
1960- when the prohibition on political parties came into force- to December 1993. 
(Boraine:141)  
 
The parliament act established three different committees of the TRC. The Human Rights 
Committee held public hearings for victims and survivors. The reparation and rehabilitation 
committee designed a long-term policy for compensation and urgent assistance. The Amnesty 
committee investigated the applications for amnesty. (Boraine:145) The Mandate held that the 
TRC should finalise its work by 31 July 1998, but this deadline was postponed to 31 October 
the same year. (Puuvunen:13) 
 
Combining investigations of government acts and those of non-governmental forces is one 
strategy for increasing authoritativeness, and avoiding charges of victor's justice. One danger 
is that the two types of violence will be seen as functionally equivalent. (Popkin:274) The 
mandate of the TRC did not exclude offences committed by other actors than those belonging 
to the former regime, instead the commission had a broad spectra of potential perpetrators to 
examine. 
 
The Act held that any killing, torture, abduction, or severe ill treatment should be considered 
as a gross violation of human rights. (vol.1:72) The term gross violations of human rights 
thereby excludes a number of violations committed during the apartheid regime. For instance, 
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detention without a trial of at least 78.000 people, jailing of about 18 millions of people for 
pass law offences, and the forcible removal of millions of people did not fall within the 
jurisdiction of the TRC (Sarkin:659) This exclusion must be seen as the most problematic 
one. Many victims of human rights abuses would never have the chance to tell the 
commission about their fate, and many perpetrators would not be publicly named. Of course, 
it would be impossible for the TRC to investigate all abuses that took place within the given 
timeframe, but there is a risk that the final report would not be able to provide a complete 
picture if certain patterns of human rights violations, not amounting to gross violations, were 
left unexamined.     
 
3.2.2 Access to information 
The standpoint taken by the TRC is that truth is necessary for reconciliation. This 
point of view is not uncontroversial. It could be argued that reconciliation would 
be difficult to achieve when the truth is as horrific as in the case of South Africa.  
On the other hand it seems implausible that true reconciliation could be achieved 
when there is no complete picture, and no knowledge about what to forgive, forget 
or reconcile with. However, this thesis is not elaborating further on this question. 
Instead it takes the position that a commission that is not able to present facts 
about the past in an impartial and precise manner will receive little confidence 
among the public and its findings will be largely neglected. The impact of the 
commission depends on its possibilities to display a complete picture. It is 
therefore important to examine to what extent the TRC had access to information. 
 
Access to information could be seen as the most evident advantage of a truth commission, 
since it makes it more likely than a court to present a balanced picture of the past. However, 
inability to call hostile witness, preserve or obtain documents, visit military or police 
installations had made it difficult for most investigating commissions to go beyond 
descriptions of general patterns. (Popkin:273) Further,  widespread destruction of evidence of 
crimes by the outgoing regime, public fears about testifying, weakness or corruption in the 
administration of justice and lack of co-operation from the police or army are common 
problems for truth commissions (Freeman, Hayner:128). The problem of inadequate 
resources, whether a deliberate strategy or not, also applies to truth commissions. Human 
rights investigations for the purpose of establishing the truth about controversial and 
important cases demand an intensive investment of human resources. (Cassel: 333)  
 
At the TRC, there were hundreds of days of public hearings. There was also a unique 
diversity in the types of hearings held, including victim hearings, amnesty hearings, special 
thematic hearings12 , special event hearings13 , institutional hearings14 and political party 
hearings.15 (Albon: 290-291). 
                                                 
12 Special hearings were held to identify patterns of abuse, for instance attention was drawn to women, youth, 
and compulsory national service. 
13 Event hearings included testimony from victims, experts, and perpetrators. 10 different events were 
highlighted, including the 1976 Soweto student uprising and the 1990 seven days war between ANC and 
Inkatha. 
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The TRC was granted powers of subpoena and seizure and investigations. They could secure 
documents and political parties and the security institutions agreed to hand over material. 
(Boraine:146) In the individual victim hearings, no cross-examination took place, while in the 
investigative hearings, people were subpoenaed to appear, and lawyers, victims, and 
commissioners could question them. (Vol 5:8) In all the Commission examined about 50 000 
cases of gross violations of human rights. (Vol 1:136) 
 
The amnesty committee was composed of judges, lawyers, and advocates from the South 
African legal system. The committee has been said to often marginalize victims. It has also 
been alleged of being a legal show between lawyers. Since the lawyers tried to protect their 
clients from incriminating themselves, they often played the role of a silencer and restricted 
the valuable information that could be obtained. (Fullard, Roussea:202) The absence of 
thorough investigations also meant that the committee missed opportunities for gathering as 
complete a picture as possible. The investigation and research unit closed down in 1998, just 
as the amnesty process started its most hectic phase. (Fullard, Roussea:209) 
 
The investigations unit's inspections of inquest records, court records, prison and police 
registers, and other historical documentation provided information to the TRC. (Vol 1:86)  
Statements were received from those who had approached the TRC, this indirectly excluded 
witnesses from those hostile to the Commission. For instance the IFP, who was hostile to the 
Commission, did not give many statements on alleged violations committed by ANC, and was 
subsequently found to be the principal perpetrator in the KwaZulu Natal region. In addition, 
statement takers also sought out potential statement givers. (Jeffery: 41-42) This may have led 
to an unbalanced selection of information.  
 
The dissenting commissioner, Malan, claims that because of the threat of extradition and 
persecution in other countries, applicants often refused to disclose information on cross-
border operations, most of which were carried out by the SADF. (Vol 5:453) The TRC 
experienced great problem in receiving information from the military. The person appointed 
the focal point, channelling information, was in fact acting as a gatekeeper. (Bell:262) In the 
final report, the commission also expresses disappointment on SADF, SAP, and the National 
Party for their submissions. (Vol 5: 196) 
 
Boraine argues that the TRC has been able to secure information far beyond what any trial 
could have done. (Boraine 2003:172) One counter argument is that regular courts are in a 
better position to produce accurate information. In these courts the defendant are usually more 
passive himself, while in the TRC the applicant will testify in order to be granted amnesty. 
Testimonies in a regular court could then be seen as more credible. The rules of evidence will 
also increase the credibility of information received.  (Slye:173)16 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 Institutional hearings were carried out in order to seek evidence from various professions, institutions, and 
organisations about their role. These hearings triggered self-analysis and helped the commission in formulating 
recommendations. (health sector, prison, media, legal, faith community) 
15 Political party hearings enabled the parties to make their own submissions and for the TRC to ask substantive 
questions to them. (Vol 5: 145-150) 
16 The commission must use fact-finding methods that are understandable and beyond challenge. Popkin:271 The 
Commission in El Salvador had two primary objectives: come up with a fact-finding process that inspired 
confidence in the sense that the public was convinced that the Commission really wanted to know and tell the 
truth, do everything in their power to ensure that the truth of their findings could not be impugned. Buergenthal: 
318)  
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3.3 Promoting the rule of law 
 
 
It is clear that rule of law was not a fact in apartheid South Africa, both legislation 
and practices indicates this. For instance, the Vorster laws meant the suspension 
of the principle of no detention without being brought before a competent court. 
The security legislation's definition of sabotage included more or less all forms of 
dissent. (Vol. 1 p.38) The separation of educational facilities and the creation of 
Bantu States are also clearly examples that implies the lack of rule of law. 
 
Equality before the law is a basic precondition for the rule of law, and treating those who 
witness impartially is a crucial matter. (Crocker:106) The Act holds that victims shall be 
treated equally without discrimination of any kind, and there does not seem to have been any 
severe critic against the commission on this ground.  
 
To promote the rule of law, the TRC should recognise that it is itself a subject of law. The 
very mandate derives from a parliamentary Act which upholds the position of legislation in 
the country. Both domestic and international law is promoted in other respects as well. In 
arguing for its position on issues concerning its mandate, the TRC applies international law 
and its norms. 17 (Vol 1 p. 72) When determining whether an act was associated with a 
political objective, the TRC used criteria from extradition law and the notion of a political 
offence.18 (McDonald: 166) All the gross violations of human rights also constituted crimes 
under the laws that operated during the apartheid years. (Vol 5: 449). Thus, the principle of 
non-retroactive legislation was upheld, since no-one was inflicted for an act which did not 
constitute a crime at that time. 
 
The question of whether the TRC and its power to grant amnesty is contrary to existing 
international law is also relevant. If the process itself constitutes a breach of the existing 
legislation, the rule of law is ignored. Mendez recognises that the international community has 
made progress in recognising that a legacy of grave and systematic violations generate 
obligations that the state owes to victims and society, although disagreement remains as to the 
content of this obligation. (Méndez: 255) According to Dugard, international law obliges a 
successor regime to punish members of the previous regime for acts that constituted crimes 
under international law. (Dugard: 262) Boraine is on the other hand invoking a duty to 
safeguard human rights and prevent future violations by state officers or other parties, rather 
than a duty to prosecute. (Boraine 2003: 168) One can at least conclude that granting amnesty 
in the way it was practised in the TRC is not a clear-cut violation of international legal norms.   
 
Further on the power to grant amnesty, Neier argues that concern for victim is necessary to 
uphold the rule of law, one cannot sacrifice the victims on behalf of a larger concern. The 
granting of amnesty would therefore counter the rule of law. (Neier 1997: 99) Zalaquett on 
the other hand says that according to the rule of law the victims cannot hold a veto power or 
decide on the general rules of society. (Zalaquett 1997:103) Since the amnesty power is 
                                                 
17 See for example discussion on victims right to reparation and the notion of gross violation of human rights. 
18 Motive of the offender, the context in which the act took place, whether it was committed in the course of or as 
part of political uprising, disturbance or event, and whether it was directed at a political opponent/state property 
or individuals.) 
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vested in national legislation and is not violating international law according to most 
academics, the process of granting amnesty must be said to be compatible with the rule of 
law.  
 
The legality of the amnesty provision was also addressed in a South African court decision. In 
a case brought against the TRC19, the Constitutional Court was asked to declare the Act, or at 
least those sections dealing with amnesty as unconstitutional. The Court dismissed the 
application and held that the limitation of right to access if victims to the courts and the 
granting of amnesty for criminal liability were found to be permitted in the Constitution 
according to the court.  
 
There was no legal basis for the procedural work of the commission, instead a small number 
of persons set up the rule and practices that guided the commissions work, and a lot of the 
practices were also established a long the way. This does not appear to be a democratic 
solution, nor in accordance with the rule of law. (Henwood) 
 
It is of crucial importance to establish public confidence in the administration of justice. 
(Fernandez: 219) The rule of law requires a proper working judiciary and to develop a well 
functioning court system must be a priority. A truth commission could be an important tool in 
pursuing this object. However, instead of contributing to institution building or encouraging 
the courts to take action, they may serve to take serious human rights violations out of the 
sphere of judicial action. It is also a danger that the commission will be viewed as a substitute 
for other actions. (Popkin:289) The truth commission could in its efforts to pursue justice 
diminish the authority of the judiciary. 
 
Investigating commissions shortcut some of the difficulties inherent in using normal 
investigating channels. Both the courts and the police have been at least complicit in the rights 
violations, and neither is capable of independent inquiries. Reforming or creating an 
independent, capable judiciary is a long-term undertaking. The appointment of competent 
judges, not associated with the failings of the past often awaits the emergence and training of 
a new generation (Popkin:264) In a society in transition, the courts are often composed of 
judges from the old order, and this was also the case in South Africa. (Sarkin 1999:254) 
 
During the apartheid regime, Many people viewed the judiciary as independent, and 
sometimes even referred to as a liberal institution. But some judges obviously supported the 
apartheid legislation, and the margin of interpretation that existed was not utilized to lessen 
the oppression. Instead pro-apartheid interpretation of the legislation was often the case, and     
the courts did contribute to the apartheid regime. The lack of confidence in the judicial system 
among the black population led to a development of alternative courts. (Bindmann:110, 117) 
The Commission's findings on the judiciary held that it collaborated largely by omission, in 
the legislative and executive pursuit of injustice. It also actively contributed to the execution 
of apartheid. 20(Vol 5:253)  
 
The South African criminal justice system was already under severe pressure. The 
possibilities to investigate, prosecute, and accommodate prisoners were all limited. 
(Vol.1:122) 
                                                 
19 AZAPO, the Biko, Mxense, and Ribeiro families v. the State president, Minister of Safety and Security, and 
the TRC. CCT 17/96 
20 The Pretoria Bar's refusals to admit black members and an apparent collusion with the police regarding torture 
of detainees is two examples 
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Even though the existing judicial system was not living up to sufficient standards, a financial 
and educational effort into the system might have got it on the right track. If the money spent 
on the TRC would have gone into the judiciary instead that system might have been able to 
deal with the past accurately. Crocker is on the other hand arguing that the TRC is less 
expensive and speedier than a regular court procedure. (Crocker:104) Parallel court 
proceedings against perpetrators during the apartheid years has taken place. For instance, the 
prosecution and imprisonment of Eugene de Kock, a police force leader21, took place when 
the TRC started its work. (Crocker:104). As a point of reference it could be mentioned that in 
this trial alone it took 18 months to secure a single conviction. (Vol. 1:123)  
 
The TRC criticised criminal trials on various grounds, claiming they were too costly and took 
too long time. Former Commissioners have now been appointed to high positions as judges 
and may promote a TRC approach in the ordinary criminal justice system as well. (Jeffery: 
17-19) By criticising the judiciary, the TRC may have reinforced the public perception of 
them as an inappropriate forum for enforcing justice. 
3.4 Promoting accountability  
 
As held earlier, accountability is a crucial feature of a democracy. The lack of 
accountability for the past abuses risks the creation of a human rights culture. 
(Slye:179) Different truth Commissions have had different practices when it 
comes to the issue of amnesty and accountability, so there is no single, necessary 
relationship between truth commissions and amnesties. (Cassel: 327)  
 
Truth commissions can promote the accountability of perpetrators of human rights violations 
in several ways. One way to provide some individual accountability for past abuses is to 
publicise the names of those thought to be responsible for organising or executing the crimes 
committed. This might have negative effects on the reputation, career, and political prospects 
of the individual. (Popkin: 280)22 The publication of a persons' name is popularly understood 
to indicate their guilt, even though the reports stress that it is not a judicial body. (Hayner: 
648) According to this line of reasoning naming names will contribute to putting an end to a 
culture of non-responsibility. An alternative is to turn the names obtained over to the regular 
courts for subsequent prosecutions. (Popkin:280)  
 
By granting amnesty, perpetrators are supposed to be encouraged to tell their story. However, 
granting amnesty to perpetrators in return if they choose to reveal the history might not attract 
them. In some cases the risk of persecution is so insignificant due to the lack of proof that the 
perpetrators do not really have anything to gain by putting themselves in the limelight. One of 
the most significant shortcomings of past truth commissions has been their inability to secure 
meaningful cooperation from perpetrators. TRC has been described as an exception, with its 
power to grant individual amnesty to perpetrators of politically motivated crimes. In the 
absence of a credible threat of prosecution, it is unlikely that perpetrators will feel compelled 
                                                 
21 commander of the Vlakplaas command, also known as the police death squad 
22 In El Salvador, the commission recommended that those identified as responsible for serious act of violence 
should be removed from the offices that enabled them to commit these acts. (Buergenthal: 318) 
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to apply for an amnesty. They are more likely to prefer to remain silent, thereby avoiding any 
risk of public shame or social indignity. (Freeman, Hayner: 137) 
 
It would not be possible to claim criminal accountability for all human rights violations. 
Criminal procedures are time-consuming and it is often difficult to find sufficient evidence. 
This means that a majority of the perpetrators will not be convicted for their crimes. 
(Boraine:147) Further, the small number of trials would only reveal information directly 
relevant to specific charges. (Vol 1:122)  
 
There was unwillingness among some political leaders to accept accountability. Boraine:156) 
Only a few applications came from high level security officers or police officers. Many of the 
most important persons, like Botha and other Ministers, did not apply.23 (Puuvunen:16) The 
Inkatha party continued to demand a general amnesty for their members, and most of its 
members refused to participate in the amnesty process. (Slye:172)  
 
Truth commissions can complement the work of criminal prosecutors by gathering 
information, organising and preserving evidence. They can also build a case for and 
recommend forms of accountability short of criminal sanctions, such as civil liability, removal 
from office, restitution or community service schemes. (Freeman, Hayner:126) By gathering 
information and preserving evidence that can be used in prosecutions, accountability could be 
ensured in cases where an exclusive trial procedure would probably not have been able to 
gather sufficient evidence. Both Albon and Benomar argue that truth commissions should 
submit evidence of crime to the courts for criminal prosecution. (Albon:290-291) 
 
By naming their names the truth commission can impose the moral punishment of public 
condemnation.24 On the other hand the naming of names could possibly reinforce the 
impunity it is supposed to put an end to, by making it clear that these persons have committed 
human rights violation, and still should not be held accountable. 
  
The provisions on amnesty held that in order to get amnesty, the applicant give full disclosure 
of his or hers acts. The acts must have been committed in good faith as part of a struggle 
against the state or against any publicly known political organisations or liberal movement 
engaged in the struggle against the state. The acts must also have been committed within the 
scope of the persons' authority and duties, or the person must have believed they were. 
(Boraine 1997: 153) 
 
Applicants were required to apply for amnesty for each offence they committed and the 
applications had to be made within the timeframe.25 The applicant should declare the nature of 
their offences thereby effectively acknowledging their culpability. Amnesty hearings 
involving gross violations of human rights were to take place in public, save in exceptional 
circumstances. The name of person, information relating to the crime, would be published if a 
person was granted amnesty. In cases were amnesty applications were not made or 
unsuccessful, the way was left open for conventional criminal trials, when the prosecuting 
authority decided that there wee sufficient grounds for prosecution. (Vol.1: 118) The Act 
                                                 
23 Only one Minister, Adriaan Vlok applied for amnesty.(Fullard:201) 
24 In El Salvador, the commission also made binding recommendations that they should be removed from office 
and that legislation should be enacted to bar them from public service during 10 years. (Cassel: 330) 
25 Only acts committed between 1960-1994 were considered. The applications had to be handed in by the latest 
10 May 1997. (Boraine:148)  
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prevented victims from pursuing criminal or civil suits against perpetrators who had been 
granted amnesty. (McDonald:164)  
 
The Amnesty committee received 7127 applications for amnesty in total. (Puuvunen:16) 
About half of those who applied were in prison at the time. (Sarkin 1998:659) The Amnesty 
committee has turned down a number of applications, and encouraged the public prosecutor to 
start a criminal procedure in these cases. In this way the TRC has contributed to the 
attribution of responsibility and the claim for legal and other measures. (Crocker:105) The 
Amnesty Committee could request the appropriate authority to postpone court proceedings, if 
the alleged perpetrator was under scrutiny in the committee. By the end of its term of 
operation, the TRC had been unable to hear and decide upon all amnesty applications, but the 
amnesty committee continued its work and considered all the applications it had received. 
(Vol 1:157) The trials and guilty verdicts on de Kock26 and Motherwell rendered before the 
deadline for amnesty applications probably encouraged several persons to file their amnesty 
application. The granting of amnesty to Captain Brian Mitchel for the Trust Feeds massacre in 
KwaZulu-Natal might also have encouraged some applications. (Sarkin 1998: 659)  
 
ANC took collective responsibility for human rights violations, but the TRC received few 
statements from ANC leaders. The submission by their ally UDF was also unsatisfactory; it 
included almost no information or statements. The submission of IFP barely mentioned the 
violations it had caused, moreover, the party visited party members in prison and tried to 
persuade them not to apply for amnesty. Such applications would reveal that the IFP was the 
second biggest perpetrator, the state being the biggest (Vol 5:199-201) Many security police 
officers handed in amnesty applications with detailed accounts, which revealed a pattern of 
abuses.  
 
If there had been trials instead of a truth commission in South Africa, there is a strong 
possibility that the majority of those accused would have been found not guilty, due to lack of 
evidence and skilful prosecutors. (Boraine 2003:172) One argument is that in courts, the most 
skilful rather than the most truthful side will win. But it could be argued that it is better to 
establish at least some personal responsibility than no responsibility at all. (Shriver:68- 72)   
 
The TRC should also contribute to institutional reforms and long-term development. The 
commission needs to identify the reason for past abuses and take action to reform 
fundamental institutions, such as the judiciary, the police, and the military. This is an 
advantage to courts, which can of course not put systems and whole institutions on trial, while 
truth commissions can bring communities, institutions, and systems to moral judgement. 
(Shriver:68- 72) The hearings that the TRC held with institutions also aimed at encouraging 
internal investigations and reforms. (Crocker:107)  
 
The final report contains a wide range of recommendations. On the issue of accountability the 
TRC recommended that where amnesty has not been sought or been denied, prosecution 
should be considered. The commission agreed that it would make available information on 
allegations of human rights violations. Further the TRC recommended that granting of general 
amnesty should be resisted, and that attention must be paid to prosecution of SADF members 
who are found to have tortured, assaulted, or killed persons in their care. (Vol 5:309) P. W. 
Botha's refusal to appear before the TRC led to a criminal charge, and a court found him 
guilty of failing to attend before the Commission. (Vol 1:197) Hopefully, implementation of 
                                                 
26 S v. Eugene de Kock, 1995-96, Transvaal Supreme Court, CC26/94 
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the Commission's recommendation on the reform of the South African Police Service may 
help to restore the trust between SAPS and the majority of South Africans, and thereby 
contribute to formal justice in the long-term. (Vol.1:122) 
3.5 Promoting a human rights culture 
A human rights culture could not develop in apartheid South Africa. The system 
bred intolerance, a culture of violence, and a general lack of respect for human 
rights. (Sarkin 1998: 628) This section will examine whether the practice of the 
TRC could help to foster a human rights culture and special attention will be 
given to the issues of fair trial and impartiality.  
 
Ideally, truth commissions would contribute to the fortification of a new legal culture. 
(Shriver: 65) In the final report, the TRC recommends that the government should commit 
itself to regular and fair elections, and open and transparent governance. (Vol 5 :311) 
Concerning access to justice, the TRC recommends that a code of conduct for prosecutors 
should be drawn up in order to assist and empower victims. The government must also ensure 
that a minimum consistent standard of legal repress is extended to accused persons. (Vol 
5:322) Further, the TRC emphasis that training of all personnel within the justice system is 
essential. To improve the representative composition, the imbalance in gender and race in the 
high court must be addressed. An audit of the courts administrated by chiefs in former 
homelands is also called for (Vol 5: 326, 327) These are all recommendations which will 
promote a human rights culture if implemented. 
 
The TRC examined gross violations of human rights and by publicly condemning these acts 
the value of certain norms could be strengthened. For instance, the prohibition of torture must 
be seen as an important part of a democracy for those who have followed the work of the 
commission. In displaying the impact these violations have had on the victims, an 
understanding of the need for a human rights culture could be enhanced.   
 
3.5.1 Impartiality 
In order to fulfil the conditions of a fair trial a court must be impartial, both in a 
objective and subjective respect. This means that judges should act impartially, 
but also that there should not be any reason to doubt the impartiality of the court, 
it should be and be viewed as impartial.  
 
The composition of the commission is a crucial factor when looking at the question of 
impartiality. As examined earlier, in the establishment of the court, great causation was 
practiced when selecting the commissioners. In fact, the principle of having a democratic 
procedure, where overlooked on two occasions in order to get a more politically balanced 
commission.  
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The TRC expressed the approach that any group or person inside or outside the state could 
commit human rights violations27, (vol.1:69) and final report consequently condemned 
political organisations across the spectrum. Notwithstanding this there has been a lot of 
opposition against the TRC.  Especially the white populations regarded the TRC as bias, and 
it was said to be loyal to the ANC. The opposition continued after the establishment and some 
individuals brought an action against the TRC to a Court, and accused it of lack of due 
process. (Boraine: 153, Jeffery: 85) However, the criticism of bias came from all parts of the 
society, there were no necessary link between support of the NP and criticising the 
commission. (Henwood)  
 
The TRC also expressed the view that the acts of apartheid and anti-apartheid activists could 
not be morally equated. (Jeffery:124) This statement could provoke the perception that the 
commission was not fully impartial in fulfilling its task. Complaints to the public protector 
were issued by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), who claimed that the TRC had acted biased 
against the IFP, and that IFP's constitutional rights had been violated. Former SADF members 
also claimed that TRC had displayed bias, prejudice, and lack of impartiality towards SADF. 
(Vol1:196) The National Party wrote a letter to the Commission, demanding an apology from 
the Chair and vice chair of the Commission for expressing their disappointment at a press 
conference about the National Party and their evidence presented at the TRC. This accusation 
of partiality of the TRC was settled at a meeting between Tutu and the new leader of the NP. 
(Vol1:345-247) 
 
Jeffery lists a series of events not included in the report, most of them concerned attacks on 
IFP members. (Jeffery: 89-93) For example that the TRC did not examine in depth the abuses 
that took place in foreign ANC camps, where allegedly torture and inhuman treatment 
occurred. It must be said here that ANC is the only example of a nongovernmental entity that 
has established a commission to investigate and publicly report on its own human rights 
abuses.28 Sarkin points out that the work of the commission should not be controlled or 
influenced by the government. (Sarkin:1999:231) In 1998 the government passed regulations 
                                                 
27 Among those PAC, IFP. ANC, SAP, SADF 
28 In 1991 a group of former detainees of ANC camps, all formerly active ANC members detained under 
accusation of being agents of the State formed a “Exiles Committee” and forced the ANC to investigate camp 
abuses by bringing international attention to the issue. In March 1992, Nelson Mandela appointed the 
“Commission of Enquiry into Complaints by Former ANC Prisoners and Detainees”. Two of the three 
commissioners were ANC members, and it was criticised for its bias. The commission submitted a report to 
Mandela documenting torture and other abuses regularly inflicted on detainees. The report did not name names 
of responsible individuals but recommended that urgent attention should be given to identifying and dealing with 
those responsible for maltreatment of detainees. The report was immediately issued to the public and to the 
press, although ANC later began questioning the accuracy of the report and refused to distribute it further. 
Mandela accepted collective responsibility for the leadership of ANC, but insisted that individuals should not be 
named or held personally accountable.  (Hayner:625-626)   
 
Shortly after the first ANC commission, Nelson Mandela named a new commission of inquiry to again look at 
the alleged abuses in ANC detention camps. The commission structured its proceedings much like formal court 
hearings. It hired counsel to represent the complainants and a legal defence team to represent the defendants. The 
commission held public hearings and the accused were given the opportunity to confront and question their 
accusers. The report reached conclusions similar to the first commission, it was positively met by most 
observers. The report is concluding with a list of specific individuals who violated the rights of each 
complainant. The ANC accepted its general conclusions and called for a truth commission to be set up to cover 
abuses on both sides of the conflict. (Hayner: 632-634) 
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defining "relatives" and "victims" (Gov. Gazette no. 6154 April 1998, Fernandez:213) This 
practice could clearly harm the publics’ view on impartiality of the commission.  
 
The TRC did face severe accusations of impartially, although the commission officially laid 
great weight on conducting its investigation in an impartial manner. The composition of the 
TRC must also be characterised as fulfilling the demands of impartiality.  
 
3.5.2 Naming names and due process 
In order to establish the rule of law it is of importance to take into account the 
principles of fair trial. One of the most vividly discussed questions is whether 
naming names of offenders should be part of the mandate of truth commissions. 
Due process requires that individuals accused of crimes must be allowed to defend 
them but truth commissions do not have the same strict procedures as courts do. 
Generally they do not have the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the offenders 
may not be heard in an oral hearing. Further, a right to a legal counsellor seldom 
exists. Even though they are not judicial bodies, their report is authoritative and 
the public will probably understand the publications of a person's name as an 
indication of their guilt. (Freeman, Hayner:135-136, Hayner: 647-648) Even 
though no sanction is imposed on a perpetrator it is therefore necessary to uphold 
at least a minimum standard of fair trial. Victims also appear before the 
Commission, and their rights should also be taken into account.  The needs of 
those who have and are still suffering from grave abuses are not less in a truth 
commission than in a court room. 
 
Freeman and Hayner argue that it is both unnecessary and undesirable to burden truth 
commissions with due process requirements equivalent to those of a court. Burdening a 
commission in this way would seriously undermine its ability to carry out its most essential 
duties by considerably slowing down the investigation and hearing process, thereby reduce its 
capacity to gather facts and evidence. (Freeman, Hayner: 136) This argument could result in 
some serious shortcomings concerning the object to consolidate democracy. The Commission 
risks, in its efforts to vindicate the human rights of past victims of violence, violate the human 
rights of the persons it now accuses. (Cassel: 330) 
 
Two contradictory principles could be argued for:  
(1) Due process requires that individuals receive fair treatment and are allowed to defend 
themselves adequately before being pronounced guilty, due process is violated if a 
commission report names individuals responsible for certain crimes, without 
providing the person these rights  
(2) (2) Telling the full truth requires naming persons responsible for human rights crimes 
when there is absolute evidence of their culpability. Naming names is part of the truth-
telling process, even more so when it is clear that the judicial system does not function 
good enough to expect that they will be prosecuted. (Hayner: 648)  
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The Act required publications of all names of those who received amnesty.29 The TRC argues 
that the naming, and thereby the personal injury, to some extent could be justified by the 
public importance of the Commissions truth-seeking role, the limited outcome of these 
findings, and the adoption of a fair procedure. (Vol 1:90) 
 
Due process is not an inflexible concept. Less process is due in non-criminal than in criminal 
case. According to Cassel, truth commissions charged with naming names should not be 
permitted to bypass normal standards of due process for civil cases, except in situations where 
the judiciary does not function, and there is no other feasible way to breach official immunity 
for egregious human rights violations. (Cassel: 331)30 One can exemplify with the practice of 
plea bargaining in for example the U.S. The defendant is then encouraged to wave certain due 
process rights and in return the sanctions will be lessened. (Levinsson:224) Thus, there could 
be different standards of fair trial depending on the circumstances. 
 
The Act did not provide for procedural rules for the public hearings of amnesty applications 
so the Amnesty Committee set up its own practices. On its discretion, the committee could 
also allow for cross-examination of anyone giving evidence, but the scope and extent of the 
cross-examination could be limited. (Coetzee: 188) 
 
The work of the TRC was challenged in Court on a few occasions. In the case of du Preez and 
van Rensburg v. TRC31, the applicant sought to prevent a testimony about them. In the first 
instance the judge held that the TRC was not obliged to give prior notice, only if the 
commission was to make a decision after the hearing implicating him, should he be granted an 
opportunity to submit representation. However, the Appellate court ruled that implicated 
perpetrators were entitled to timeous notice of allegations against them. This notice should 
include details by way of witness statements or other document to enable them to identify the 
person making the allegations, the date and place of the incidents where appropriate. The 
TRC might also be under a duty to hear rebutting evidence and permit immediate cross-
examination of a witness at hearings. The TRC therefore adopted a practice of sending out 
notices to alleged perpetrators with all the necessary documentation, the ruling also obliged 
the TRC to give alleged perpetrators a prior view of its findings. (Vol 5: 204-205) This 
decision raised other concerns such as the risk that the hearings would be to legalistic and 
formal, and a potential public perception of the TRC as perpetrator friendly. 
 
The rights of victims was not elaborated on in any court case, their right to legal 
representation and possibility to cross-examine alleged perpetrators were therefore not as 
complete as one may have wished.  Most of the victims had to rely on the TRC's legal 
                                                 
29 Some commissions have not been expressly granted the power to publicly name those individuals found to be 
responsible for human rights crimes but have effectively identified individual perpetrators by printing direct 
quotations of witnesses or victims that mention the perpetrators name. Alternatively it have been possible by 
identifying those who headed particular units or regions where particular violations took place, thereby making 
perpetrators’ identity easily discoverable. In other cases, attribution of individual responsibility has been effected 
by deliberate or unintentional press leaks.  (Freeman, Hayner:135) 
30 In El Salvador, Most witnesses requested that their testimony should be treated as confidential. The parties 
assumed that few Salvadorans would come forward and testify in public in fear of reprisals and the commission 
realised that these fears were well-founded.(Buergenthal:300) 
The Commission in El Salvador decided that no single source or witness would be considered sufficiently 
reliable to establish the truth on any issue of fact needed for the commission to arrive at a finding. Secondary 
sources, such as reports from national or international bodies did not constitute a sufficient basis on their own for 
arriving at findings..(Buergenthal:301)  
 
31 CPD, case no. 4443/96 
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assistance scheme, since their tariffs were low; the lawyers were also generally less skilled. 
The former state employees and members of a liberation movement were supported with legal 
assistance by the state. The state had higher tariffs and better lawyers therefore often 
supported the amnesty applicants. However, as Boraine stresses, wealthier perpetrators always 
have access to better legal representation. (Boraine.2003:170) 
 
In the case of Niewoudt v. TRC, a former member of the Security Branch in Eastern Cape 
requested that the TRC should be interdicted from allowing evidence unless he had received 
notice and copies of all relevant documents.  The court held that it was inappropriate to equate 
the TRC with an administrative hearing, and undesirable to place such obstacles before the 
TRC. Thus, there was no requirement of prior notice to the alleged perpetrator. The matter 
was finally set with an agreement, which held that the applicant should be given an 
appropriate opportunity to submit representations or give evidence. The TRC would also take 
all reasonable steps to in good faith to provide the applicant with any witness statement in its 
possession that might implicate him, and give information about when and where such 
evidence was to be heard. ( Sarkin 1996:632, South Eastern Cape Local Division 1136/96) 
 
It could be noted that there were two court decisions not obliging the TRC to give prior notice 
to a person that might be implicated in a hearing. Notwithstanding this, the TRC adopted a 
practice that gave alleged perpetrators a fair chance of responding to any accusations. This 
implies that the due process standard was sufficient in this respect. 
 
Any part to the amnesty process had a right to have legal representation. (Vol 5:114) 
Moreover, the applicant could ask the High Court to review its decision. (Coetzee: 188) These 
human rights standards were apparently also respected. 
 
The TRC holds that there were no naming of an individual when the identities were unclear, 
or when a notice had not been sent to the alleged perpetrator. Institutions, but not individuals, 
were named when only institutions could be identified. The commission named both 
institutions and individuals when sufficient evidence was available. (Vol. 1:92)  
 
Here, it must be remembered that in determining a person's culpability the TRC used the 
balance of probability as a principle. The question to be answered was which version 
presented is the most likely. (Vol. 1:90) This means that a lower burden of proof than in 
conventional criminal justice was applied, where the guilt must be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt. It could thus be questioned whether the evidence was actually sufficient in some cases. 
The TRC often did not bother to give reasons for its findings, which also makes it difficult to 
understand how it reached its decisions and how well it performed the balance of probability 
decision. It is however clear that the TRC on some occasions presented findings conflicting 
with earlier judicial rulings, and even in the report itself there are some conflicting facts about 
an incident. 32 (Jeffery: 14-15, 129) 
 
The minority position of Malan held that most of the statements concerned violations 
experienced by others and many of them were hearsay. Further, most victims did not bring 
any supporting documents or any other evidence. About 90% of the victim statements were 
not given under oath and very few were tested under cross-examination.33 Exceptions to the 
                                                 
32 For instance this is the case concerning the reports on the Sebokong shootings in March 1990, were the TRC 
contradicts a previous investigation.  
33 The amnesty hearings were on the other hand open to cross-examination. 
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general rule that hearsay evidence must be excluded are relatively few. (Jeffery:8, 31,37). 
(Vol 5: 441)  
 
Concerning the evidence received from the amnesty process one can note that only 102 of the 
amnesty applications had proceeded through public hearings and been granted amnesty. The 
TRC nevertheless assessed relevant material from all amnesty statements. Much of the 
information in the amnesty application could be labelled as accomplice evidence, the 
applicant had reason to place the responsibility of the act on his supervisor or accomplice 
offender. Without doing any independent verification, the names contained in these 
applications could be publicised. Relying on secret testimony and self-serving allegations of 
amnesty applicants seeking to escape imprisonment could not be in accordance with 
established legal principles. (Jeffery: 9) It is clear that the TRC relied on at least some 
untested data to support its findings. The TRC also used court records as evidence. Jeffery 
argues that although this source of information could only be considered as reliable if the 
person was found guilty in the ruling, but the TRC used other court records as well. (Jeffery: 
53, 65)   
 
The TRC held that witnesses were not subject to cross-examination unless there were glaring 
falsehood or inconsistencies in their testimonies. (Vol 1:144) The alleged perpetrator right to 
cross-examine was not allowed in more than a handful of cases. In general victims and 
perpetrators were not invited to give evidence at the same hearings. (Jeffery:31)  
 
Wouter Basson, who was the head of the chemical and biological weapons programme, was 
subpoenaed to witness before the TRC. He brought an application to the TRC where he 
argued that compelling a witness to testify would amount to a violation of witnesses right to 
remain silent, and the right against self-incrimination. The Commission ruled that the witness 
was compelled to testify, and Basson's application to the Cape High Court was dismissed. 
(Vol 1 ) It would at least seem questionable to base a finding on the information received 
from a person not willing to give a testimony, the risk that not the full truth should be revealed 
in such a hearing must be evident.  
 
There are reasons to believe that the practice in which the information was acquired in order 
to publicly condemn a perpetrator did not fulfil the normal standards of fair trial. This might 
be counter-productive to the promotion of a human rights culture which should be an essential 
part of the object of a truth commission. 
 
 
3.6 Public criticism of the TRC 
The legitimacy and possibility to reach out with the norms and values are of 
course impeded by public criticism against the TRC. Most of the criticism of the 
TRC has already been accounted for in previous section. For example, the 
question of impartiality of the commission evoked a number of accusations. The 
white community often seemed either indifferent or hostile to the work of the 
commission. The response of the former state, its leaders, institutions and most 
civil society at that time was reluctant. (Vol 5: 196) Some NGOs raised critic 
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against the TRC, arguing that it overemphasised the ideal of reconciliation as 
forgiveness, not giving attention enough to accountability and compensatory 
support for victims. (Crocker:112) Accusations of incompetence and racism was a 
constant theme during the first year. Some of the staff were suspected of being 
involved in human rights violations themselves. Commissioner Dumisa Ntzeba 
was also accused of involvement in a massacre in Heidelberg 1993. (Bell:262-
264) 
 
The Commission once referred a decision of one of its own bodies, the Amnesty Committee, 
to the court. A decision of the Amnesty Committee to grant amnesty to 37 ANC members for 
their collective responsibility was challenged, and the Cape Town High Court granted the 
Commissions application and referred the matter back to the Amnesty Committee. 34 The 
commissioners were not unanimous in their final findings. One of the commissioners (Malan) 
issued a minority position, where he heavily criticised the work, and the findings of the TRC. 
The amnesty committee gave priority to those who were in prison, not to high profile 
applicants, and this policy was also criticised. (Coetzee:191) Further, the TRC has been 
criticised for its expenditure on unnecessary items and very high salaries. (Sarkin 1996:660) 
 
A critique against the committee is that the process focused too much on "trigger pullers", and 
thereby ignored the wider spectrum. (Fullard, Roussea:203) Applicants were able to refer to a 
certain context in their applications that satisfied the committee, while in fact there were other 
causes that triggered the incidents. This resulted in a lack of attention to the context. (Fullard, 
Roussea:208) 
 
Although the TRC faced a lot of criticism it is probably safe to suggest that critics of the 
findings would probably be just as strong if it had been investigated by the judiciary instead. 
It would be impossible to please all the different views on what, how, and when the past 
should be accounted for, no matter which type of institution used.     
 
 
                                                 
34 27 of the applicants were not granted amnesty, among those Thabo Mbeki. 
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4 Public outreach 
In order to implement  the values and norms represented by the TRC among the 
public the outreach is of crucial importance. Mainly two means of reaching out to 
the public can be detected. Firstly, the hearings were often public and could be 
followed either live at the session, or as televised dramas. Secondly, the report 
was meant to inform the public about the past atrocities. The public policy of the 
commission could also itself contribute to the consolidation of democracy. Public 
trials are usually considered to be a core feature of a fair trial process, and they 
may also serve to prevent future acts of vengeance and violence. The nature and 
the existent of a commission’s outreach efforts will profoundly affect its access to 
information, its effectiveness in addressing the needs of victims, and its ability to 
manage public expectations. Generally the courts are more constrained concerning 
the public outreach than truth commissions are, and the TRC had a branch 
working on public relations matters only. 
 
There are persuasive reasons for a commission to hold public hearings. By giving victims and 
survivors a chance to tell their story before a public audience a commission can formally 
acknowledge past wrongs. Allowing conflict parties to hear each others suffering may help to 
build empathy and thereby deterring acts of vengeance. The risk of renewed violence anti-
democratic movements would then be reduced. Truth Commissions can provide a public 
platform for victims, which will also help to educate the public about the individual human 
impact of past crimes and establish fair and effective definitions and categories of victims. 
Further, they can catalyse public debate (Freeman, Hayner:126, 134) 
 
However, there may be legitimate reasons not to hold proceedings in public; security risks for 
commissioners and victims, time and resource constraints, and concerns about judicializing 
the proceedings. (Freeman, Hayner:134) When fairness and neutrality can be generally 
assured, then private, confidential investigations may be preferred. Public investigations risk 
scaring away witnesses that otherwise might testify, or putting in danger those that do. This 
would of course hamper the fulfilment of the object to reveal the full truth. (Hayner:647) 
There were certain possibilities for the TRC to hold hearing behind closed doors. (Puvunen: 
17) But mostly public hearings were held in the Amnesty committee.  
 
The TRC attempted to have openness to public participation and scrutiny. The Commission 
televised many of its sessions and the media have reported thoroughly from the investigations. 
The media helped generate public debate on central aspects of South Africa's' past. (Vol 
1.104) Televised statements can likewise open the eyes of people who ignored or justified the 
old regime and create a democratic culture and reconciliation. (Minow: 62, Freeman: 126). 
Public perception were formed by what people saw on TV, heard on radio, or read in the 
newspapers. This made the commission more vulnerable to criticism. It was accused of 
untested allegations, which was probably due to the inquires that led to findings were less 
visible (closed hearings, research, the decision-making process) (vol.1:105) Further, in 
general it is not clear that public demonstration, such as to receive testimony and interview 
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witness in public, have not been for political reasons, such as to discredit the past regime, 
rather than for the purpose of impartiality and full disclosure. Hayner:647) 
 
The TRC made an effort to be accessible for the public. The national office of the TRC was 
situated in Cape Town, and regional offices were established in Johannesburg, Durban and 
East London, and satellite offices were also established in Bloemfontein and Port Elizabeth.  
(vol.1 45-47) However, the size of SA made it difficult to ensure that everyone could access 
the TRC.35 Vol1:138) It invited victims to make statements, which it took at its offices as well 
as at hearings held in various communities in the country. (Vol 1:138-140) The majority of 
the South African population lives in rural areas and most household in remote areas had no 
TV, radio, access to newspaper or effective means of transport. People were turned away 
since they had missed the deadline when they wanted to make statements. The list of victims 
published by the TRC was therefore not complete. (Fernandez:213) Concerning the hearings, 
it could be noted that less then 1/10 of those who made statements testified in public. The 
TRC was obliged in prioritising concerning which cases should be presented to the public. 
(Vol 5:9) 
 
A part from the report it would be favourable if the truth commission published its mandate as 
well. By doing this, unrealistic expectations of the work and outcome of the commission 
could be avoided. The TRC actually failed to publicise its mandate, but the NGO Justice in 
Transition published it. (Sarkin 1996: 639)  
 
Both Albon and Minow stress that the commission’s work should be publicised. If the 
commission is unable to produce a thorough report of the past human rights violations it runs 
the same legitimacy problem as courts do. The accusation of a bias report is an evident threat 
to the path to democracy. If the efforts to reconcile the nation with democratic measures fail, 
people might consider other alternatives. (Albon: 290-291, Minow: 82) Eventually the report 
will become the main source of information and interpretation of the apartheid era. (Jeffery: 
25) It is therefore even more important that the account of the past in the report is as accurate 
as possible. 
 
The impact of a final report in many ways depends less on its content than on surrounding 
factors. When and how the report is publicised, how widely it is distributed, how much 
coverage it receives in the media and whether there are both traditional and alternative 
presentations of the findings are some of the factors determining the impact. (Freeman, 
Hayner:135) The report did not create much debate in South Africa, the people did not engage 
and discussed the outcome, rather the TRC and its objects were considered as a closed 
chapter. (Henwood) 
 
The TRC put great emphasis on the importance of being accessible and to reach out to the 
public with its findings, and this will enhance the chances of implementing the norms and 
values of the commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 1,2 million Square meters 
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5 Conclusions and Summary 
The last chapter will attempt to summarize the conclusions reached in the thesis. 
The thesis examines the truth and reconciliation commission in South Africa and 
its possibilities to act as a vehicle in the process of consolidating democracy. The 
norms and values that can be found in the principles and practices of the 
commission are scrutinized, and the means of presenting this norms to the public 
is also looked into. The issue of how to deal with the human rights violations of a 
past regime forms the theoretical framework, and the truth commission are 
compared with the traditional solution of court proceedings. In particular, the 
question of whether to grant amnesty or not is in focus. Further, the possibilities to 
strengthen the rule of law, promoting a human rights culture, promoting 
accountability, and deterring future return to non-democratic governance are 
examined. In the study both shortcomings and advantages of a truth commission 
are displayed.  
 
The alternative of addressing the past abuses in court procedures could result in several 
outcomes. Establishing accountability and rule of law is essential in the process of 
consolidating democracy, and prosecuting human rights violations is a signal that no 
individuals are outside the reach of legal accountability. Protecting the individual by 
punishing offenders is also a way of restoring the rule of law. Further, prosecution can help in 
the efforts to establish democratic values and encourage the public to believe in them.  
 
Failure to hold criminals accountable for their acts can threaten the position of the new 
democratic regime. The prosecutions could easily be regarded as arbitrary and as neglecting 
the due process of the rule of law for a number of reasons. Not all of the perpetrators will be 
prosecuted and this will raise questions concerning the selection of cases. The trials will never 
be able to give a neutral and comprehensive overview of the past atrocities. There is also a 
great risk that the judiciary does not have enough resources to deal with the prosecutions in a 
fashion that promotes the rule of law.  
 
The impact of a truth commissions is also a complex issue, they to runs the risk of being 
captured in the hands of political reality. The old regime might disagree with giving the 
commission a too vast authority and the new regime might want to politicise the structure in 
their favour. A truth commission is inherently vulnerable to the politically imposed 
limitations. Its structure, mandate, political support, financial or staff resources, access to 
information, willingness or ability to take on sensitive cases, and strength of final report will 
be largely determined by the political realities in which it operates. 
 
In naming the names of perpetrators the commission promoted a form of accountability, even 
though no formal sanctions were imposed. However, many of those who were publicly 
viewed as the biggest perpetrators did not apply for amnesty. The recommendation to 
prosecute those not granted amnesty is of course a direct attempt to collect accountability. 
Sadly, South Africa seems to be moving away from the recommendation to prosecute instead 
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of pardoning. In May 2002, the government pardoned 33 ANC and PAC members, of which 
20 had been refused amnesty by the TRC. (Sarkin 2003:252) Although the TRC 
recommended prosecutions, no trials are under way, except the trial of Wouter Basson. 
(Boraine 2003:178) Basson was acquitted by the Pretoria High Court in April 2002. (Sarkin 
2003:249 
 
In the establishment of the TRC, the idea of having democratic commission was a significant 
feature. Both the mandate itself, established in the Parliament, and the selection of 
commissioners encouraged public participation. The very establishment of the TRC could 
itself promote democracy by showing that institutions could and should function 
democratically. The terms of reference provided the commission with a broad scope of events 
to investigate. The  mandate did not restrict the violations to examine to only the acts of the 
former regime, but the TRC was criticised for  not looking sufficiently into allegations against 
the ANC. Further, those human rights violations not regarded as gross violation where not 
examined.  
   
Generally truth commissions have a better chance than courts to produce an overall picture of 
the past human rights violations, and this can promote the process of reconciliation and 
understanding, which diminishes the risk of renewed violence. In order to succeed in making 
such a compilation, it is not only important to investigate violations performed by different 
part of the society, but also to have access to the necessary information. The TRC had a 
variety of means to acquire this information, but due to some impediments, mainly by the 
groups that did not support the commission, the information, and thereby the accounts of past 
abuses, may have been less complete than what was expected.  
 
In large, the work of the TRC had a legal basis and did not neglect the rule of law, although 
some aspects of its practice are more ambiguous in this regard. To promote the rule of law, it 
would also be fruitful to foster a well functioning judiciary. The practice of having a truth 
commission instead of court procedures will deprive the judiciary a chance of restoring faith 
in the legal system, but it is uncertain whether the courts were ready to actually take this 
chance. By recommending that some amnesty applicants should be prosecuted, the TRC did 
nevertheless try to reinforce the role of the judiciary and the rule of law.  
 
The TRC shed light on many gross human rights violations and the effect it had on the 
victims, which is an important task in the promotion of a human rights culture. It could 
however be concluded that some of the standards of fair trial that forms part of the accepted 
core of human rights was not applied. This cast a serious shadow over the commissions effort 
to promote human rights. It could of course be argued that these incompatibilities with human 
rights norms promoted democracy in other aspects. By not following the established legal 
principles, like right to cross-examination TRC is acknowledging the needs of victims and 
enable them to reconcile and prohibit future violations from their side. Further, accusations of 
impartiality could also have damaged the commission when it comes to enforcing human 
rights norms. 
 
It has not been my intention to make a complete evaluation of the TRC and its impact on the 
consolidation of democracy, such a project would not be possible within limited scope in time 
and size of a Bachelor thesis. The time for that study has probably not arrived yet.  Rather, the 
aim has been to examine the role of truth commission from a theoretical perspective, looking 
into the possibilities to assist in the consolidation of democracy. 
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